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Abstract—In this work, we are focusing on a new and yet uncovered way for malicious apps to gain profit. They claim to be dating
apps. However, their sole purpose is to lure users into purchasing premium/VIP services to start conversations with other (likely fake
female) accounts in the app. We call these apps as fraudulent dating apps.
This paper performs a systematic study to understand the whole ecosystem of fraudulent dating apps. Specifically, we have proposed a
three-phase method to detect them and subsequently comprehend their characteristics via analyzing the existing account profiles. Our
observation reveals that most of the accounts are not managed by real persons, but by chatbots based on predefined conversation
templates. We also analyze the business model of these apps and reveal that multiple parties are actually involved in the ecosystem,
including producers who develop apps, publishers who publish apps to gain profit, and the distribution network that is responsible for
distributing apps to end users. Finally, we analyze the impact of them to users (i.e., victims) and estimate the overall revenue. Our work
is the first systematic study on fraudulent dating apps, and the results demonstrate the urge for a solution to protect users.
Index Terms—Fraud, Mobile App, Dating App, Malware, Android.
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1 INTRODUCTION
MOBILE malware is rapidly becoming a serious threatin recent years. The main incentive for attackers to
develop malware is that they could gain illegal profit. For
example, previous research showed that malware authors
could gain a profit by injecting advertisements in benign
applications (or apps in short) [1], or by sending SMS mes-
sages to premium-rate numbers [2]. With the deployment of
new defenses in the latest Android versions, these methods
become less effective. However, we have observed a trend
that malware authors have invented new ways to make a
profit.
In this paper, we focus on a new and yet uncovered
way for malicious apps to make a profit. Users are lured
into installing a particular kind of dating apps and paying
subscription fees for the right to chatting with existing users.
However, the sole purpose of these apps is to cheat new
users into paying, as the existing accounts in these apps are
usually fake identities managed by chatbots. This kind of
apps is therefore referenced as fraudulent dating apps (or FD
apps in short).
Properties of FD Apps FD apps are usually distributed
through online advertising networks, enticing users to in-
stall them with attractive pictures or fake claims. Once it is
installed, users need to register an account to use the app.
Surprisingly, this process is much simpler than what we
have expected. Indeed, during our analysis of some apps,
we find that the user only needs to click a few buttons
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to register a new account, without providing any personal
details such as email address or phone number. This is
different from the traditional malware that aims to steal
user’s private information.
After registration and logging into the app, many (fe-
male) accounts will initialize conversation requests to the
user within a few minutes and likely with seductive words
or pictures. For instance, during the manual analysis of one
of the apps in our study, seven users sent conversation re-
quests after logging into the app for 5 minutes (Figure 1(a)).
All of them were female with attractive profile avatars. Two
different users (the last two) were sending the same message
(“Where are you from?”) at the same time (8:29).
Due to this abnormal user behavior, we suspect that
the existing accounts in the app are not real people but
chatbots. To confirm our speculation, we sent messages to
a randomly picked user (nickname: Beautiful Mirror), and
the replied messages were irrelevant to the topic of the
conversation (Figure 1(b)). Interestingly, after sending one
message, we cannot send messages for free anymore.
In order to continue the conversation, we have to sub-
scribe to the monthly premium service (Figure 1(c)) with
a cost around seven US dollars. After purchasing the ser-
vice, the previously communicated users stop responding
immediately and there were no more users attempting to
communicate with us anymore.
This app is not a single case: there exists an underground
ecosystem for these FD apps. In particular, if a dating app
shows the following behaviors, it can be categorized as a
FD app. 1) abnormal user behaviors: after a new user logs into
the app, several users will start a conversation in a short
period, e.g., a few minutes; 2) irrelevant messages: messages
are usually irrelevant to the conversation and out of the
topic; 3) premium services: a new user cannot send or can only
send a few messages for free, unless a premium service is
ar
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2(a) Many users want to start conversa-
tion within a few minutes
(b) The messages are usually irrelevant
to the conversation
(c) Premium service is needed to con-
tinue conversation
Fig. 1: An example of a FD app.
purchased. Finally, after purchasing the service, other users
suddenly stop responding to any messages. To distinguish
with the fake accounts in the app, we call the new user who
is purchasing the services as a victim.
Study Overview In this paper, we perform a systematic
study of FD apps, including the characterization of the user
profiles and interaction patterns, the business model and
involved parties in the ecosystem, as well as the distribution
and the impact of these apps to victims. In particular, our
research aims to answer the following questions. First, are
the existing user accounts in FD apps are real persons or
chatbots? Second, what is the business model of the FD
apps, and what parties are involved in the ecosystem? Third,
how are the FD apps distributed? Fourth, what is the impact
of these FD apps to mobile users? For instance, how much
money might be charged to a victim?
To this end, we first propose a method to detect FD apps
from 2.5 million apps downloaded from nine third-party
Android app markets1, and the Google Play. In total, we
have detected 967 distinct FD apps and classified them into
22 families based on their code similarity. We then perform
detailed analysis on the detected apps and observe some
interesting findings, listed as following.
• We found that most of the accounts in these apps are
chatbots, with fake user profile avatars. For instance,
we find that the same user profile avatars are used
by multiple different accounts in the same app, and
even in different apps.
• There are multiple parties involved in the ecosys-
tem, including app producers, app publishers, and
1. Since the Google Play is not available in some countries or regions,
these third-party app markets are the de facto official markets in these
countries or regions.
distribution networks. For example, we find that
one developer key has been used to sign many FD
apps with different package names, and published
by different companies with the same legal represen-
tative(s).
• These apps are usually distributed through app mar-
kets and advertising networks. The fraudulent rank-
ing techniques, e.g., fake user reviews and ratings
are used to manipulate the ranking of the apps (i.e.,
promote the apps).
• We conduct an estimation of the overall revenue for
the FD apps we have detected based on several re-
ports. Our estimation concludes that the total market
scale is around 200 million US Dollars to 2 Billion US
Dollars.
Contributions In summary, this paper makes the follow-
ing main contributions:
• We have presented a new way adopted by malware
authors to make a profit through luring users into
buying premium services in dating apps.
• We have conducted a systematic study of FD apps
and answered several key research questions. To
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first
systematic study of such kind of apps.
• Our investigation has revealed various interesting
findings that are previously unknown to the commu-
nity. We believe our study is the first step towards a
better detection and regulation of such apps.
To engage the community, we will release all the FD apps
we identified in this study and the experiment results to the
research community for further analysis.
3TABLE 1: Overview of our dataset and the distribution of
identified FD apps.
Market #Apps # FD Apps # FD Apks
Baidu Market 227,454 673 3,227
360 Market 163,121 177 1,761
Tencent Myapp 636,265 432 2,782
Xiaomi 91,190 91 974
Wandoujia 554,138 285 2,767
Huawei 51,303 308 1,994
Lenovo 37,716 186 1,994
OPPO 426,419 305 1,628
Meizu 80,573 512 2,571
Google Play 287,110 7 123
Total 2,555,199 967 3,697
2 FRAUDULENT DATING APPS CHARACTERIZA-
TION
In this section, we first present our approach to identify FD
apps in Section 2.1. Then, in order to answer the following
research question: Are the existing user accounts in these apps
real persons or chatbots?, we dissect the existing account
profiles in different FD app families and then analyze the
interaction patterns between users of those dating apps in
Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, respectively.
2.1 Identifying Fraudulent Dating Apps
2.1.1 Dataset
Table 1 presents an overview of our raw dataset that con-
tains more than 2.5 million apps collected from ten Android
app markets, including the official Google Play store. All of
these apps were downloaded between April and August
2017. We have also crawled the metadata of these apps,
including app name, publisher company name, app version,
rating, the number of downloads, etc.
2.1.2 Methodology
We propose a semi-automated approach to identify FD apps,
as shown in Figure 2. We first use a fast keywords matching
method on the app metadata (e.g., app description and app
name) to filter dating app candidates from the millions of
apps we have crawled. Then we perform static code analysis
on the selected candidate apps to check whether they have
embedded in-app purchase services.
The rationale behind this checking is that those services
are essential for the app publisher to gain a profit, i.e.,
for victims to purchase premium services. For the dating
apps that embed in-app purchase services, we then cluster
them based on resource similarity and code similarity. For
apps in each cluster, we manually select several apps to
inspect whether they have suspicious characteristics such
as abnormal user behaviors and irrelevant messages, which
make those apps as fraudulent app candidates. We also
analyze the user comments to further confirm that there
exist victims of these apps in the real world.
Keywords Matching Because the FD apps usually use
seductive texts to attract victims, we first collect several
common words (in both English and Chinese) that fre-
quently occur in the descriptions or app names of those
apps, including “secret dating”, “local single”, “find girl”,
etc. We use a fast keyword matching method to identify
TABLE 2: Third-party in-app purchase services.
Alipay https://www.alipay.com
WeChatPay https://pay.weixin.qq.com/index.php/core/home/
Paypal https://github.com/paypal/PayPal-Android-SDK
YeePay https://www.yeepay.com
Ping++ https://www.pingxx.com
BaiduPay https://www.baifubao.com
JieShenPay http://jieshenkj.com
IPayNow Ipaynow.cn
LianlianPay http://www.lianlianpay.com/international/
UnionPay https://merchant.unionpay.com/join/index
MengPay http://www.cnmengpay.com
PayEco https://www.payeco.com
SwiftPass http://www.swiftpass.cn
JuHe https://www.ijuhepay.cn
JuBaoPay http://www.jubaopay.com/#/
99Bill https://www.99bill.com
IAppPay https://www.iapppay.com
BBNPay https://www.bbnpay.com
TABLE 3: An Overview of 22 FD app families.
Family # Apks #Pkg Family # Apks #Pkg
Youyuan 1,104 496 Yuanlai 70 12
Appforwhom 742 70 Qianshoulian 272 15
Youairen 596 140 Erwanshenghuo 25 4
Yueaiapp 37 20 Zlewx 16 5
Tanliani 165 26 Xiangyue 53 25
Wmlover 179 32 99Paoyuan 44 5
Tongchengsupei 50 42 Qiaiapp 27 13
Jiangaijiaoyou 32 13 Meiguihunlian 65 2
Aiaihunlian 31 10 Jucomic 22 8
Sipuhaiwei 55 13 Ailiaoba 7 2
Yuanfenba 51 11 Michun 54 3
Total 3,697 967
potential dating app candidates. Eventually, we are able to
identify 61, 133 apps (out of 2.5 million apps) that contain
at least two keywords.
In-app Purchase Analysis One of the most important
characteristics of FD apps is that they try to entice users
to purchase their premium services. For the selected dating
app candidates, we perform static code analysis to detect
whether they contain embedded in-app purchase services. If
so, they will be identified as candidates for further analysis.
In our study, we take advantage of LibRadar [3], an
open source obfuscation-resilient tool to identify third-party
libraries used in Android apps. We consider 18 popular
third-party in-app purchases SDKs that are widely used in
both China and worldwide, as shown in Table 2.
Note that, besides the third-party in-app purchase ser-
vices, the in-app purchase service provided by the Google
Play is also considered in our study. In some countries or
regions where the Google Play service is not available, app
developers tend to use third-party in-app purchase services.
For instance, the AliPay [4] and WeChatPay [5] are the two
most popular third-party in-app payment services in China.
Since some apps may implement their own payment
functions (e.g., send SMS to premium number) instead of
directly embedding third-party payment services, we fur-
ther investigate the related English and Chinese keywords
(e.g., “Purchase & VIP”, “Privilege”, etc.) in the layout con-
figuration files to identify app candidates as supplementary.
In total, we have identified 23, 546 dating apps that contain
embedded in-app purchase services.
App Clustering For the dating apps that embed in-app
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Fig. 2: Our approach to identify FD apps.
purchase services, we then cluster them based on resource
similarity and code similarity.
We first take advantage of the open source system
FSquaDRA2 [6] to measure the resource similarity of each
app pair based on a feature set of resource names and asset
signatures (the MD5 hash of each asset of an application
excluding its icon and XML files).
We then use an app clone detection tool WuKong [7] to
measure code-level similarity. For the apps with resource
similarity scores higher than 90% and code-level similarity
scores higher than 85%2, we group them into the same
cluster. Finally, we select the cluster whose size is equal or
bigger than 2. In total, we identified 5, 547 candidate apps
into 226 clusters (size >= 2).
Manual Inspection For apps in each cluster, we manually
select three apps3 (596 apps in total). We installed them
on smartphones and then registered real accounts to check
whether they have the typical characteristics such as ab-
normal user behaviors (many users will start conversations
even though our registration information is empty or totally
unattractive), irrelevant messages and premium services.
With the help of manual inspection, we eventually flag
22 out of the 226 clusters as FD app families.
2.1.3 Statistics of Fraudulent Dating Apps
As shown in Table 3, we have identified 3,697 FD apps
(APKs) that share 967 unique package names4. These apps
account for 6% of dating apps in our dataset, which is much
higher than we expected. For each family, we choose the
keyword from the package name that has the most number
of downloads as the family name. For example, the family
Youyuan includes the most number of unique package names
and APKs, as roughly one third of the APKs and more than
half of the packages belong to this family.
The distribution of FD apps for different markets is
shown in Table 1. The Baidu Market hosts the most number
of FD apps, where more than two-thirds of total FD apps are
from this market. The official Google Play market contains
the least number of FD apps, where only 7 apps are flagged.
2. we choose the threshold empirically based on the previous studies
3. If the cluster size is 2, we select both apps.
4. One app (package name) corresponds to several APKs because our
crawler downloads different versions of apps during a 4 months span.
Fig. 3: Protocol Analysis: the request and response messages
to retrieve user information.
2.2 User Profile Analysis
2.2.1 Protocol Analysis
It is non-trivial to harvest account profiles from FD apps,
as they are not directly available on the devices. We hence
resort to the network traffic traces to retrieve user profiles.
Particularly, we randomly select three apps in each family
and run them on real smartphones. We then leverage tcp-
dump to record the network traffic traces. Table 4 shows the
server addresses of user profile requests and the download
addresses of avatar files for each family. Surprisingly, all
three apps we analyzed for each family share the same
server address, even if they have different package names
or developer signatures.
We further investigate the request and response mes-
sages for user information retrieval, as shown in Fig-
ure 3. The request messages usually contain information
like geo-location data, platform information, the number
of requested user information, etc. The response messages
contain a list of users where each of them is represented by
a unique identifier, a URL of the avatar file, and some other
personal information (e.g., nickname, age, etc.).
By deeply looking into those request and response mes-
sages, we observe that some apps (e.g., app com.hzsj.qmrl
and app com.wanjiang.tcyasq in the app family Youyuan)
embed a fingerprint or package name in the request
message to differentiate the apps (Figure 3). Moreover,
some apps (e.g., app com.yuanfenapp.tcyyjiaoyou and
app ltd.onedream.snsapp.moaiyueai in the app family
5TABLE 4: Server Address Analysis of 22 FD App Families.
Family Addr of User List Request Download Addr of Avatar
Youyuan hulu.youyuan.com ptw.youyuan.com
Appforwhom aus.appforwhom.com img0.appforwhom.com
Youairen api.youairen.cn/api/users cdnimg.365yf.com
Yueaiapp napi.yueaiapp.cn nimgup.yueaiapp.cn
Tanliani api.tanliani.com img.miliantech.com
Wmlover app.wmlover.cn cdn.wmlover.cn
Tongchengsupei jiaoyouappslb.tongchengsupei.cn
makefriends.oss-cn-qingdao.
aliyuncs.com
Jiangaijiaoyou jiangaijiaoyou.com image.jiangaijiaoyou.com
Aiaihunlian ad.aiaihunlian.com img.aiaihunlian.com
Sipuhaiwei app.sipuhaiwei.com piccdn.sipuhaiwei.com
Yuanfenba api2.app.yuanfenba.net image.yuanfenba.net
Yuanlai mobileapi.yuanlai.com photo4.ylstatic.com
Qianshoulian mpc5.qianshoulian.com mpc5.qianshoulian.com
Erwanshenghuo api.erwanshenghuo.com pic.erwanshenghuo.com
Zlewx zlewx.com image.zlewx.com
Xiangyue v1.5xiangyue.cn 7xkly7.com1.z0.glb.clouddn.com
99Paoyuan api2.99paoyuan.com img7.kainei.com
Qiaiapp app.qiaiapp.com photo.qiaiapp.com
Meiguihunlian api.meiguihunlian.com photo.meiguihunlian.com
Jucomic yuemei.jucomic.com photo.jucomic.com
Ailiaoba friend.ailiaoba.com.cn liaobaimg1.mosheng.mobi
Michun api.michun.fallchat.com youyu-michun.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.com
Tongchengsupei) may share exactly the same request and
response messages, resulting in identical accounts.
2.2.2 Crawling Account Profiles
To crawl the account profiles, one straightforward approach
is to simulate the protocol for each app. However, because
account information is usually shown based on geo-location
(e.g., you could only browse the user locations in the same
city), and each request could only get limited number of
users (e.g., one page), we need to analyze the request URLs
to identify the corresponding fields, and construct request
messages (e.g., change the city or the page number of user
profiles) so as to crawl as many as possible user profiles.
Unfortunately, app developers could use anti-crawling
techniques such as embedding hash values in the request
URLs, to keep us away from automatically harvesting their
account profiles. Due to this reason, we propose to employ
automated app testing techniques to infer user profiles.
In particular, we leverage an automated UI testing tool
DroidBot [8] to generate UI pull-down events and send to
the tested apps to emulate real user behaviors of browsing
the account list.
2.2.3 The Presence of Fake Account Profiles
It is difficult to measure how many fake accounts actually
exist in each app since it is impossible for us to start a
conversation with each account to check whether he/she
is a real person or not. Motivated by the characteristics
of Romance Scam fraud [9] that the scammers usually
post profiles using stolen photographs of attractive people,
we believe the fake accounts in FD apps may also use
stolen/online photos too. To identify fake accounts in a fast
manner, we regard the accounts with the same avatar photos
but totally different account information (e.g., nickname,
hometown, age, etc.) within the same app as fake accounts.
In this study, we use Dup Detector [10], a pixel-level
comparison technique to identify duplicate images. Note
that some apps offer default avatar photos during registra-
tion, which could mislead our detection. Thus we exclude all
the default avatars from photo comparison. For each family,
we randomly choose an app and crawl all the account
TABLE 5: The distribution of fake account profiles within
the same app for each family.
Package Name # Account Profiles # Fake Account Profiles Percent
Youyuan 57,779 7403 12.81%
Appforwhom 5,108 130 2.55%
Youairen 263,932 153,842 58.29%
Yueaiapp 2245 6 0.27%
Tanliani 969 0 0.00%
Wmlover 5516 683 12.38%
Tongchengsupei 3663 42 1.15%
Jiangaijiaoyou 1872 0 0.00%
Aiaihunlian 663 4 0.60%
Sipuhaiwei 23,946 1646 6.87%
Yuanfenba 3864 25 0.65%
Yuanlai 2178 8 0.37%
Qianshoulian 5431 312 5.74%
Erwanshenghuo 474 0 0.00%
Zlewx 3410 30 0.88%
Xiangyue 6451 38 0.59%
99Paoyuan 7829 411 5.25%
Qiaiapp 3422 2 0.06%
Meiguihunlian 7132 127 1.78%
Jucomic 4173 43 1.03%
Ailiaoba 3348 2 0.06%
Michun 5948 0 0.00%
profiles. As shown in Table 5, for the app com.jqyuehui.main
belonging to the Youairen family, we are able to crawl over
263,000 account profiles.
Figure 4 shows examples of fake account profiles we
have found in our crawled data, from which we can observe
that fake accounts may exist within the same app, within the
same family, or even across different families.
Fake Accounts within the Same App We first measure the
fake account profiles within each app. As shown in Table 5,
although we have identified fake account profiles in most
of the apps, the percentage of fake account profiles within
each app is not high. Only three apps have more than 10%
of their account profiles detected as fake ones. Most of the
apps have less than 1% of fake account profiles.
Note that, this is a conservative way to identify fake
account since different fake accounts inside one app could
use different avatar photos. We will analyze the interaction
patterns in Section 2.3 to further detect the fake accounts.
Fake Accounts within the Same Family For each family,
we choose three apps to examine fake account profiles
across apps but within the same family.
Since it is generally time-consuming to analyze the
protocol of a given app to simulate the request messages,
in this work, we select four popular families (12 apps in
total) to perform our measurements. For every app family
considered, we ensure that the apps inside the family are
different (i.e., has different package names). The type of
account information (e.g., age, location) may slightly vary
across different apps, we therefore regard the accounts with
same avatar photos but different nicknames as suspicious fake
accounts.
As shown in Table 6, the rate of suspicious fake accounts
within the same family is significantly high. For example,
around 95% of account photos of the selected three apps
in Youyuan family are overlapped. The ratio of overlapping
account profiles in Appforwhom family even achieves 100%.
Further analysis reveals that all the apps in this family use
the same protocol for accessing account information.
Fake Accounts Across Families We measure the ratios of
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Fig. 4: Examples of fake account profiles.
TABLE 6: The distribution of fake account profiles within
the same family.
Family # Account Profiles # Fake Account Profiles Percent
Youyuan 137,497 130,558 94.95%
Appforwhom 15,324 15,324 100%
Youairen 431,697 237,476 55.01%
Sipuhaiwei 58,194 36,642 62.97%
TABLE 7: The distribution of fake account profiles across
families.
Family Youyuan Appforwhom Youairen Sipuhaiwei
Youyuan 7403(12.81%) 137(2.68%) 3186(1.21%) 1435(5.99%)
Appforwhom 133(0.23%) 130(2.56%) 712(0.27%) 56(0.23%)
Youairen 3305(5.72%) 751(14.7%) 153842(58.29%) 2152(8.99%)
Sipuhaiwei 1316(2.28%) 58(1.14%) 1897(0.72%) 1646(6.87%)
account profiles overlapping across different families. As
shown in Table 6, the overlapping ratios across different
families are not high, where all of them are less than 10%.
One possible reason is that apps in different families are
from different developers and have different sources of
account profiles.
Mostly Used Fake User Avatars We found many fake
accounts using the same avatar photos but totally differ-
ent account information. We list the top 20 popular fake
user photos in Figure 5. All of the top 14 apps belong to
com.huizheng.yasq (family Youyuan), while all of them have
appeared in at least 130 different accounts. We also calculate
the number of different accounts with each avatar photo and
show it under the avatar in the Figure.
2.3 Interaction Pattern Analysis
We now attempt to identify fake accounts from another per-
spective, i.e., the interaction patterns. If the accounts are real
persons, then the messages should be relevant to the topic of
the conversation. Thus, we perform a field study to analyze
the interaction patterns of these fraudulent dating apps.
For each family, we randomly choose an app and install
it on a real device. Then we register two accounts (1 male
user and 1 female user) to log in and start a conversation.
Furthermore, we purchase the premium service for each app
and compare the results before and after purchasing their
services.
As shown in Table 8, we have observed several interest-
ing findings:
1) The registration process is quite easy, and most apps
do not need any personal information. As shown in
the second column of Table 8, only 4 (out of 22)
apps require the phone number, social networking
or email account during registration.
2) Several apps use template-based conversations. As
shown in the third column of Table 8, 3 (out of
22) apps use template-based conversations, which
could be found in the resource files of the app.
3) There is a huge difference between male users and fe-
male users. For male users, when they are online,
many female accounts will reach to them within
a short time (see column #4). For example, more
than 10 girls talked to our registered user for
the app com.yueai.ya007 (family: Yueaiapp) and
com.myhoney (family: Sipuhaiwei) within five min-
utes during our experiment. However, for female
users, there was no one trying to initiate conver-
sation for almost all the apps during our experi-
ment (see column #5). Specifically, for some apps
(e.g., com.liaoba), the the default gender is male
during registration and users cannot change it. This
suggests that these apps are mainly targeting male
users.
4) For more than 70% of the apps, users cannot reply to
the messages unless premium services are purchased. For
the remaining 6 apps, users could only respond to
at most 3 messages.
5) Irrelevant messages are prevalent in the conversations.
Before we purchased the premium services, we were
only able to reply to the messages in 6 apps. How-
ever, only 4 accounts in these apps replied to us and
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count: 68
com.jqyuehui.main
Fig. 5: Top 20 mostly used fake user avatars.
TABLE 8: Field study of different FD app families.
Family (package name)
Phone Num
SN account
Email
Template
based #
Chatups
(M) #
Chatups
(F) #
Free
Messages
Content
Relevance
After
Purchase
Youyuan (com.huizheng.dsya) # ! 6 0 # NA #
Appforwhom (cn.com.qncnew.aus) # # 7 5 # NA #
Youairen (com.jqyuehui.main) # # 3 0 Total 3 # #
Yueaiapp (com.yueai.ya007) # # 12 0 1 Per User # #
Tanliani (com.blsm.miyou) # # 6 0 Total 3 NA #
Wmlover (cn.umuad.dsaq) # # 5 0 # NA #
Tongchengsupei
(ltd.onedream.snsapp.moaiyueai) # # 5 0 # NA #
Jiangaijiaoyou
(com.jiangaihunlian.danshenyuehui) # # 6 0 # NA #
Aiaihunlian (com.aahl.jmyhb) # ! 3 0 # NA #
Sipuhaiwei (com.myhoney) # # 14 0 # NA #
Yuanfenba (com.xiaochen.android.fate it) # # 4 0 # NA #
Yuanlai (com.yuanlai) ! # 7 0 # NA #
Qianshoulian (com.xiangqinqin.app) # # 2 0 1 Per User # #
Erwanshenghuo (com.syty.todayDating) # # 3 0 # NA #
Zlewx (com.jshy.tongcheng) # # 5 0 # NA #
Xiangyue (com.luren.xiangyueai) # ! 5 0 # NA #
99Paoyuan (com.lingnei.kaikai) ! # 6 # # NA #
Qiaiapp (com.jiaoyou.jqya) # # 4 0 # NA #
Meiguihunlian (com.meiguihunlian) # # 4 0 # NA #
Jucomic (cn.nineox.yuejian) ! # 2 0 # NA #
Ailiaoba (com.liaoba) ! # 3 # 1 Per User NA #
Michun (com.youyu.michun) # # 8 0 1 Per User # #
the response messages were totally irrelevant.
6) After purchasing the premium services, the app stops
responding to messages. In this field study, we spent
roughly 176 US dollars to purchase premium ser-
vices for these 22 apps. Unfortunately, once we had
purchased the premium services, all apps stopped
responding to our messages. It appears that the sole
mission of these apps is to lure users into purchasing
its so-called premium services, which in reality do
not exist at all.
2.4 Summary
Based on the results of user profile and interaction pattern
analysis, we suspect that the accounts (except for the vic-
tims) in the apps are chatbots, instead of real persons. First,
the account profiles in different apps in a family are mostly
identical. These account profiles may be automatically gen-
erated. Second, our suspicion can be further confirmed by
the interaction patterns. For instance, the messages in the
conversation for the apps we evaluated are irrelevant to the
topic, and no messages will be received after purchasing the
premium services. These patterns are more likely generated
from computer programs instead of real persons.
3 BUSINESS MODEL ANALYSIS
We now analyze the business model of FD apps aiming at
revealing the involved parties in the ecosystem, so as to
answer the research question: what are the involved parties
and how they make a profit?
We first retrieve the signature of the developer’s key
inside the app. If the signatures are the same in two different
apps, we assume that these two apps are developed by
the same developer5. These developers are referred as app
producers.
5. This is a reasonable assumption since the leakage of the devel-
oper’s key is not a common case in practice.
8TABLE 9: Multiple parties in the FD app ecosystem.
Family #Pkg # DeveloperSignature # Companies #
Legal
Persons
Youyuan 496 48 113 107
Appforwhom 70 43 21 10
Youairen 140 133 27 21
Yueaiapp 20 5 4 4
Tanliani 26 10 11 10
Wmlover 32 31 9 9
Tongchengsupei 42 5 16 16
Jiangaijiaoyou 13 6 7 7
Aiaihunlian 10 5 3 3
Sipuhaiwei 13 8 5 5
Yuanfenba 11 10 5 5
Yuanlai 12 1 3 3
Qianshoulian 272 12 7 7
Erwanshenghuo 25 1 3 3
Zlewx 16 1 2 2
Xiangyue 53 22 6 5
99Paoyuan 44 5 3 3
Qiaiapp 27 3 6 6
Meiguihunlian 65 2 1 1
Jucomic 22 6 3 3
Ailiaoba 7 1 2 2
Michun 54 3 1 1
We then collect the released company names of the FD
apps from the app markets. Usually, the company name is
a required entry when publishing apps to an app market.
We also collect the name of the legal representative [11] of
the company, based on the public records from the corre-
sponding government agencies. These companies are the
ones who publish apps and obtain payments from victims.
We call them app publishers.
Table 9 shows the data of multiple parties involved in the
FD app ecosystem. In particular, the first column shows the
family name of the app, and the second column shows the
number of distinct package names in each family. The third
column shows the number of distinct developer signatures
for the apps in each family, while the last two columns
show the number of distinct company names and that of
legal representatives of the companies. The number of legal
representatives is less or equal to the number of companies
since the same person can serve as the legal representatives
of multiple companies.
Based on the data in Table 9, we obtain the following
observations.
• The number of developer signatures is usually much
fewer than the number of distinct package names in
each family. This evidence indicates that the devel-
opers of different apps may be the same person. We
also find the case that even the developer signatures
of some apps are different, the names of the RSA
files inside the META-INF directory of those apps
are identical.
For example, there are 130 apps in the family
youairen sharing the same signature file name,
namely KEY KEYS.RSA. For each signature, the val-
ues of the CN (Common Name) and OU (Organization
Unit) fields are meaningless strings such as estituan,
umgfoubq. We believe even though the signatures
of these 130 keys are different, they are probably
automatically generated by the same person. Table 10
shows the randomly generated CN and OU fields of 20
TABLE 10: The randomly generated OU and CN field in the
developers’ signatures.
OU CN OU CN OU CN OU CN
hyuhzwhl fstxzj btxetuui pfsmdm oymorwlp vrnnuv estituan hvhskr
umgfoubq vvshla mdjgjpuc tkwcpk agggefmk zhmipw kovkokxi jzmmeh
pbvdysyg kychif uzqoaawn usfzum gfpsbhmz sejwql dgvcmhxh sqsqrf
pebbomoy dacyfr xwvoirgr pgupio vdsqjkvk alzrly ugqljbld swkcom
memqwnon nmscvv wcjhpfkb lxkruk xdttilqo zaamyd hrzwtnzj hvsbwp
developers’ signatures.
• The apps belonging to the same family are published
by multiple companies. This could be explained by
the fact that the producers may sell their apps to
different companies for publishing. For instance, as
shown in the code snippet of Listing 1, the app
developer hard-coded the relationship between the
package names and the payment accounts that are
used to receive payments from victims. By doing
so, app producers could sell the same app with
different package names to different companies (or
publishers).
• One legal representative could own multiple com-
panies so that FD apps can be published multiple
times via different companies. If the apps from one
company are removed from app markets due to user
complains, the apps from other companies can still
survive.
1 s t r =package name ;
2 i f ( ”com . huizheng . lasq ” . equals ( s t r ) ) {
3 com . app . tencent . QQConstants . APP ID=”
wxba66413d0f792ffa ” ;
4 com . app . tencent . QQConstants . PARTNER ID=” 1296280201 ” ;
5 re turn ;
6 }
7 i f ( ”com . youyuan . l r x q ” . equals ( s t r ) ) {
8 com . app . tencent . QQConstants . APP ID=”
wxf54f037e28294cc6 ” ;
9 com . app . tencent . QQConstants . PARTNER ID=” 1296283001 ” ;
10 re turn ;
11 }
12 . . .
Listing 1: The code snippet showing the app package
names and their corresponding WeChatPay accounts
used to receive payments from victims
Figure 6 shows the business model of the ecosystem.
Specifically, the app producers develop apps and sell them
to publishers. The publishers usually register multiple com-
panies and use these companies to distribute their apps,
e.g., via app markets. In order to promote these apps, the
ranking fraud techniques are used (Table 11 in Section 4.1).
Moreover, the publishers could also pay the advertising
network to distribute their apps (Section 4.2). When the
victims are lured into installing these apps and buying the
premium services, publishers will receive the money and
gain a profit. Note that, the producers and publishers in
some cases may come from the same companies, and act as
both roles in the ecosystem.
4 DISTRIBUTION NETWORK ANALYSIS
App publishers usually distribute their apps through both
app markets and advertising networks (Figure 6). In this
section, we analyze the distribution of the FD apps and
answer the following question: how these apps are distributed,
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Fig. 6: The business model of the FD apps.
TABLE 11: Ranking fraud based on user reviews.
Family # Reviews #
Reviews
with Five-star
Rating
# RepeatedReviews #
Fake
Reviews %
Fake
Reviews %
Fake Reviews
with Five-star
Rating
# Users # FakeUsers %
Fake
Users
Youyuan 354,797 337,140 188,811 285,448 80.45% 95.82% 195,256 145,151 74.34%
Appforwhom 94,693 91,760 78,382 89,945 94.99% 98.73% 26,603 23,799 89.46%
Youairen 380,722 379,560 221,936 347,486 93.76% 99.26% 135,710 121,801 89.75%
Yueaiapp 20,920 19,562 13,490 17,990 85.99% 98.63% 15,895 13,811 86.89%
Tanliani 51,951 52,032 31,427 44,812 86.26% 97.74% 38,154 29,835 78.20%
Wmlover 103,162 100,183 71,787 91,081 88.29% 99.25% 62,352 52,005 83.41%
Tongchengsupei 4,746 4,594 2,007 4,230 89.13% 99.21% 3,959 3,479 87.88%
Jiangaijiaoyou 3,043 1,733 890 1,397 45.91% 78.38% 2,195 1,002 45.65%
Aiaihunlian 19,299 18,864 11,124 18,406 95.37% 99.09% 12,179 11,439 93.92%
Sipuhaiwei 46,036 45,337 27,691 44,292 96.21% 99.56% 15,603 14,287 91.57%
Yuanfenba 21,065 20,426 12,057 19,899 94.46% 98.73% 15,747 14,814 94.08%
Yuanlai 18,702 17,126 14,991 16,221 86.73% 97.95% 8,429 6,558 77.80%
Qianshoulian 38,514 37,006 24,571 34,867 90.53% 98.91% 26,346 23,509 89.23%
Erwanshenghuo 174 119 114 114 65.52% 85.96% 162 118 72.84%
Zlewx 1,004 959 775 921 91.73% 99.11% 972 911 93.72%
Xiangyue 13,408 13,108 10,604 12,865 95.95% 99.36% 9,645 9,257 95.98%
99Paoyuan 9,505 8,954 6,126 8,529 89.73% 97.74% 7,428 6,652 89.55%
Qiaiapp 8,955 8,521 6,537 7,362 85.23% 98.51% 5,780 5,088 88.03%
Meiguihunlian 1,692 1,506 758 1,289 76.18% 91.81% 1,237 1,013 81.89%
Jucomic 1,540 1,428 836 1,134 73.64% 98.21% 1,285 996 77.51%
Ailiaoba 626 592 66 306 48.88% 97.45% 611 300 49.10%
Michun 6,239 5,915 4,947 5,759 92.31% 98.15% 2,292 2,143 93.50%
Total 1,201,432 1,166,425 729,927 1,054,623 83.97% 96.70% 483,231 383,181 82.92%
and what techniques are used by publishers to promote these apps
in app markets? In particular, we collect the names and user
reviews of these apps in app markets and monitor the app
distribution through an online service [12].
4.1 App Markets
As expected, we find that app markets are the primary
choice for app publishers to distribute apps (see Table 1
for the app markets in which FD apps are detected). Un-
fortunately, the ranking system of app markets could be
manipulated (known as ranking fraud) by the owners of
FD apps so as to attract more victims.
Ranking Fraud Ranking fraud [13] refers to the behaviors
that aim to promote the ranking of apps inside app markets.
Based on the ranking mechanisms of app markets, this could
be achieved by manipulating the user reviews and rating
of an app. For each app in our study, we therefore crawl
the reviews and the ratings (if it is available) of the app in
each market as well as the names of users who have posted
the reviews, aiming at identifying fake reviews and fake
reviewers.
Specifically, our analysis is based on the following rea-
sonable heuristic: reviews from different users should be
different in most cases. Though some simple reviews such
as “great app” could be posted by different users, other
reviews with more meaningful words should not be exactly
the same. Based on this heuristic, our analysis works in the
following steps and the overall result is shown in Table 11.
First, we remove the reviews that have less than 5
words from our analysis to avoid potential false positives
introduced by simple reviews. The number of reviews, and
reviews with the highest rating (five-star) are shown in the
second and third column. We also calculate the number of
users who have posted the reviews in the eighth column.
Second, we compare the similarity of the reviews from
different users using exact text matching. If we find that re-
views from different users are exactly the same, we classify
such reviews as repeated reviews and log the number in the
fourth column. The users who have posted repeated reviews
are classified as fake reviewers correspondingly (shown in
the ninth column).
Third, we further mark all the reviews from fake review-
ers as fake reviews, which is shown in the fifth column.
This step is added because the criteria used to determine
repeated reviews is too strict (exact text matching), and
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TABLE 12: The package name of FD apps and their corre-
sponding distributing advertising networks.
package name AD Networks Package Name AD Networks
com.hzsj.kya CH com.aahl.zrl BD
com.huizheng.tcyyhz IT, CH com.huizheng.kya IT, TE
com.huizheng.dsyyh IT, CH com.mimivip.missyou TE
com.huizheng.lasq IT, CH, TE com.hzsj.bdya IT
com.youyuan.yyhl IT com.solo.peanut IT
com.hzsj.dsjy IT, TE com.huizheng.tcxax IT
com.dllingshang.tcjy IT com.yuanju.night IT
com.futuredo.quickdate CH com.lingai.gaybar IT
com.youyuan.yhb IT, TE com.meimei.yulove IT
com.tanliani CH com.dljh.fjlxy IT
com.youyuan.lrxq IT com.huizheng.jrtt IT
com.dlkuaidu.tcayh IT com.prd.tosipai IT
com.lingshang.ls IT com.hzsj.zxzdxz BD
hence may have missed reviews with only little changes,
e.g., from the sentence “This is really a good app” to “This is
really an excellent app”. By adding all the reviews from users
who have posted fake reviews, we could cover the reviews
that may be otherwise missed in the previous step.
At last, we calculate the percentage of fake reviews and
users in the sixth and last column. We also calculate the
percentage of five-star ratings of fake reviews (the seventh
column).
The percentage of fake reviews are surprisingly high,
where over 90% of reviews in 10 families are fake and more
than 95% (96.70%) of the user ratings in the fake reviews are
five-star, demonstrating that the ranking system is actively
manipulated by the publishers of those FD apps.
4.2 Advertising Networks
Previous research [14] has revealed that mobile malware
could be distributed through mobile advertising networks.
In this study, we perform an initial investigation to check
whether FD apps have been distributed through this chan-
nel. Our study leverages a third-party online service App-
Growing [12] to collect the corresponding data. In particular,
given an app, AppGrowing provides a report containing
whether this app has been distributed through an advertis-
ing network, and if so which networks have been involved.
Note that, their data is through sampling the traffics of
advertisement SDKs and thus is not complete. Nevertheless,
the data still provide some insights of the distribution of FD
apps.
Based on the three-month data from October to De-
cember 2017, the following advertising networks have been
involved in the distribution of FD apps: the Cheetah Ad [15],
IntelligentTui [16], Tencent Social Ad [17] and Baidu Ad [18].
The first one belongs to the Cheetah Mobile [19], a company
listed in New York Stock Exchange, and the second and
third advertising network belong to Tencent [20], the pro-
ducer of QQ and WeChat and one of the largest Internet and
technology companies in the world. The last one belongs
to Baidu [21], the largest searching engine and one of the
biggest mobile advertising networks in China. Table 12
shows the 26 apps we monitored and the advertising net-
works that have been leveraged to distribute those apps. In
the table, we use the following abbreviations CH, IT, TD and
BD to denote the Cheetah Ad, IntelligentTui, Tencent Social
Ad and Baidu Ad, respectively.
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Fig. 7: The cumulative distribution of the number of app
downloads.
5 USER IMPACT ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the user impact of the FD
apps from the following three aspects. First, we measure
the upper- and lower-bound of the number of victims. In
particular, we first measure the downloads distribution of
these apps, which could be used to calculate the upper-
bound of the number of victims. Then we crawl the negative
comments of these apps from app markets, which could be
used to estimate the lower-bound of the number of victims,
since these negative comments are likely to be posted by
real victims. Second, we estimate the overall revenue of
these apps based on several reports that disclose the revenue
model of these FD apps. Third, we upload all these apps
to VirusTotal to understand how many of them could be
flagged by existing anti-virus engines.
5.1 Number of Victims Estimation
Downloads Analysis: the Upper-bound We first analyze
the number of accumulated downloads for these apps
crawled from 10 app markets. Figure 7 shows the dis-
tribution. Surprisingly, around 50% of apps have been
downloaded more than 100K times, and roughly 25% of
them have the number of downloads over 1 million. App
cn.feichengwuyue has the most number of downloads (143
million).
We then examine the downloads distribution across fam-
ilies. As shown in Table 13, there are 6 families that have
achieved more than 100 million accumulated downloads, in
which the family Youyuan has accumulated downloads of
784 million. The total number of downloads for these 967
apps is surprisingly high, which has achieved 2.4 billion.
Each app has an average of 2.5 million of downloads.
Negative Review Analysis: the Lower-bound Although
we have shown that the positive reviews of these apps
are mainly manipulated by ranking fraud techniques, the
negative reviews are usually about the complaints of victim
users. We have analyzed the negative reviews of these apps.
Figure 8 shows the word cloud for the negative reviews.
Almost all of the users complain that they have been cheated
to purchase the premium services.
Thus we measure the number of victims based on the
negative comments. As shown in Table 13, we have collected
44, 752 negative reviews in total, and the family Youyuan has
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TABLE 13: User impact analysis.
Family #DLs #Avg DLs #NegaviveReviews
Est # of
Payment
Est Avg # of
Payment Profit Est (US $) Avg Profit Est (US $)
Youyuan 784.8M 1582K 22899 7.8M-78.4M 16K-158K 73.1M-731.1M 147K-1474K
Appforwhom 175.9M 2513K 2637 1.7M-17.5M 25K-251K 13.9M-138.9M 198K-1984K
Youairen 684.7M 4890K 6393 6.8M-68.5M 49K-489K 54.1M-540.5M 386K-3861K
Yueaiapp 35.4M 1769K 1186 0.4M-3.5M 18K-177K 3.8M-38M 190K-1899K
Tanliani 189.2M 7275K 2161 1.9M-18.9M 73K-728K 8.1M-80.6M 310K-3102K
Wmlover 177.5M 5548K 2490 1.8M-17.8M 55K-555K 14M-140.2M 438K-4380K
Tongchengsupei 5.3M 126K 136 53K-531K 1K-13K 0.6M-5.8M 14K-138K
Jiangaijiaoyou 6.2M 478K 1210 62K-622K 5K-48K 0.7M-6.8M 52K-521K
Aiaihunlian 4.9M 486K 358 49K-486K 5K-49K 0.5M-5.3M 53K-529K
Sipuhaiwei 65.2M 5013K 570 0.7M-6.5M 50K-501K 5.1M-51.5M 396K-3958K
Yuanfenba 9.1M 831K 591 91K-914K 8K-83K 0.7M-7.2M 66K-656K
Yuanlai 13.7M 1145K 1400 0.1M-1.4M 11K-115K 0.7M-6.5M 54K-543K
Qianshoulian 92.4M 6163K 1055 1M-9.2M 62K-616K 7.3M-73M 487K-4866K
Erwanshenghuo 11.7M 2937K 55 0.1M-1.2M 29K-294K 0.9M-9.3M 232K-2319K
Zlewx 2.5M 496K 40 25K-248K 5K-50K 0.1M-1.2M 23K-235K
Xiangyue 143.4M 5735K 259 1.4M-14.3M 57K-574K 10.9M-108.7M 435K-4347K
99Paoyuan 6.3M 1255K 481 63K-628K 13K-126K 1M-9.7M 194K-1943K
Qiaiapp 4.7M 365K 389 47K-475K 4K-37K 0.4M-3.7M 29K-288K
Meiguihunlian 0.8M 412K 89 8K-82.4K 4K-41K 65K-651K 33K-325K
Jucomic 10.9M 1357K 72 0.1M-1M 14K-136K 0.5M-5.1M 64K-643K
Ailiaoba 1.5M 759K 29 15K-152K 8K-76K 0.1M-1.2M 60K-599K
Michun 4.1M 1374K 252 41K-412K 14K-137K 0.2M-2M 65K-651K
Overall 2.4B 2.5M 44752 24.3M-243M 525K-5251K 196.7M-1966.9M 3.9M-39.3M
Fig. 8: Top words in the 44,752 negative reviews.
occupied more than half of the negative comments. This
result could be used to estimate the lower-bound of the
victims.
5.2 Payment Method Analysis and Profit Estimation
5.2.1 Price and Payment Method Analysis
For each family, we randomly choose three apps to analyze
the price of the premium services they offered. As shown
in Figure 9, the average price varies from 5 US dollars to
15 US dollars. We further analyze the payment method for
each family. All the families support Alipay and WeChatPay,
roughly 80% of them also embed the Union Pay service,
while 30% of them provide the functionalities to send SMS
to premium numbers.
5.2.2 Payment Identifier Analysis
To use WeChatPay, the merchant should define three neces-
sary parameters: appid, mch_id and secret key. The appid
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Fig. 9: The average subscription price for premium services.
and mch id are usually hard-coded in the app by app devel-
opers, which are used as the identification of the merchant.
Note that the appid is an 18-byte string with the prefix wx,
the mch id is a 10-byte digit string. Thus we first locate
eligible strings in the decompiled code and then query the
WeChatPay Web API to check whether we find the correct
strings. At last, we have identified 232 unique WeChatPay
identifiers (appid). With further analysis, we found that
one developer signature usually corresponds to several payment
identifiers, while one payment identifier always corresponds to
one company name (the distributor). This finding once again
provides evidence suggesting that app developers might sell
FD apps to different distributors.
5.2.3 Profit Estimation of FD Apps
It is non-trivial for us to estimate the profit of these FD apps.
Although we found several apps have the vulnerabilities
(e.g., leaking their WeChat Payment security key) that could
be exploited, we do not resort to exploit these apps to collect
the unpublished revenue data due to ethical consideration.
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Fig. 10: The distribution of VirusTotal Flags.
Several reports6 have disclosed some information related
with the revenue of this kind of apps. For example, it is
reported that the Chinese polices have uncovered a case
of fraudulent dating app at the early 2018, and the app
was reported to have the revenue of more than 100 million
US dollars one year. Thus we resort to these reports, and
based on the real-world cases mentioned in the reports, we
estimate the payment rate of these apps varies between 1%
to 10% of the download number on average. As shown in
Table 13, the accumulated revenue estimated for all the FD
apps in this paper could be around 200 million US Dollars to
2 Billion US Dollars, and each app has an estimated revenue
around 4 Million dollars to 40 million dollars, which is in
line with the referred reports.
5.3 Detection Results of VirusTotal
We upload all the identified FD apps to VirusTotal to explore
how many of them could be flagged by existing anti-virus
engines. Surprisingly, more than half of them are labeled
as malware by less than 1 anti-virus engine, meaning that
most anti-virus engines are not able to flag those FD apps.
Only 5% of these apps are flagged by more than 10 anti-
virus engines. This result suggests that the FD apps cannot
be sufficiently identified by existing anti-virus engines.
We then analyze the distribution of malware families
labeled by VirusTotal, as shown in Table 14. It is interesting
to see that although roughly 700 APKs (18.7%) are labeled
as LoveFraud (PUA) by at least one engine, more than 80%
of the apps in our dataset are not identified as LoveFraud,
even if they share the same behaviors and belong to the
same families.
6 DISCUSSIONS
6.1 Implication
Besides showing the fact that there are many FD apps, our
paper also delivers the following implications:
New approaches to detect FD apps. As demonstrated
experimentally, FD apps cannot be sufficiently identified
6. http://www.thatsmags.com/shenzhen/post/21999/sexy-girl-
bots-scam-1-billion-from-dating-app-users-in-china
https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-42609353
http://www.marketing-interactive.com/12-chinese-dating-apps-close-
down-after-women-found-to-be-robots/
http://www.cngold.com.cn/zjs/20180109d1897n202734126.html
http://www.lc123.net/xw/tp/2018-01-12/852867.html
http://cj.sina.com.cn/article/detail/1642467340/548172
TABLE 14: The distribution of malware samples labeled by
VirusTotal.
Malware Family Count Percent
Trojan App 1138 30.7%
Android-PUP 813 21.9%
LoveFraud (PUA) 694 18.7%
Adware 377 10.2%
LustFishingMoney 259 7.0%
Riskware App 184 5.0%
by VirusTotal, showing that our community needs to intro-
duce new automated/semi-automated approaches to detect
them. The various characteristics of FD apps summarized
in this work could be helpful to create such detectors. For
example, one malicious developer signature usually corre-
sponds to several company names, which could be helpful
in identifying suspicious apps in the markets. Besides, the
detection results of FD apps could be used to help policies
and regulators to identify the fraud rings behind-the-scenes.
A new and yet uncovered possible business model
for developing and distributing malware. Empirically,
we found that many FD apps share similar code imple-
mentation (e.g., unlikely be implemented independently)
while being released with different package names by dif-
ferent companies. We hence hypothesize that these apps
are bought (cloned) from some app developers by these
so-called distributors (implemented once and sold many
times). This sheds light on the possible business model of
other kinds of malware (e.g., ransomware), though further
investigations are expected.
Ranking fraud in app markets. FD apps use ASO meth-
ods (e.g., fake positive reviews) and various channels (app
markets and ad networks) for app promotion and dis-
tribution, which could offer insights for general malware
detection. Moreover, it raises the implication that market
operators need to apply effective means to detect and hence
avoid ranking fraud.
6.2 Ethical Consideration
Indeed, any data collected from real users need to be care-
fully processed. We take a series of steps to preserve the
privacy of (possible) involved users/malicious developers
in our data set. First, all raw data collected for this study
are open to public, we do not resort to exploit the apps
to collect the unpublished data (e.g., the revenue data),
even though we found several apps have the vulnerabilities
could be exploited. Second, we do not store all the account
profiles we crawled from the apps after our experiment,
even though almost all of them are fake. Third, all the user
avatars we listed in the paper are convinced to be fake
profiles and they could be found on the public INTERNET,
which we believe do not violate the privacy of them.
6.3 Limitation
First, the method used to detect the FD apps is conservative
and may miss some of them. For instance, we use the
keywords and embedded in-app purchase libraries to find
candidate apps. Though this method leads us to the dis-
covery of 23, 546 candidate apps, the list of keywords and
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in-app purchase libraries may not be complete and could
introduce false negatives. In addition, we use the heuristic
to find the fake reviews. Specifically, we use the exact text
matching to find the repeated reviews. This may miss the
reviews that have same meanings but in different texts.
Second, we find that FD apps are distributed through
app markets and advertising networks. These include the
app markets of leading phone vendors, e.g., Huawei, and
advertising networks from world-class Internet companies,
e.g., Baidu and Tencent. The detection result of VirusTotal
shows that most anti-virus engines cannot detect these
apps. These worrisome facts urge a more effective detection
schema of these apps, and a better vetting process of apps
in app markets and advertising networks.
Our study is mainly focused on the apps in the Chinese
app markets. Most of the fraudulent dating apps analyzed
in this paper are targeting users in China, possibly due
to the biased region distribution of apps in our dataset.
However, we believe such kind of apps may exist in many
other countries and in other languages as well, especially
the places where app vetting is not strictly enforced when
they are uploaded to an app market. In our future work,
we plan to extend our crawler to download more apps from
app markets in other countries.
7 RELATED WORK
This paper is motivated by the work of Caballero et al. [22]
and of Thomas [23], who have investigated the so-called
“underground economy” associated with malicious apps (or
unwanted software). FD apps fall into the same research
line. To the best of our knowledge, the ecosystem of FD
apps has not yet been investigated. Nevertheless, various
studies have explored the general fraudulent behaviors in
the mobile app ecosystem as well as the security aspect of
dating apps.
7.1 Fraudulent Behaviors
Fraudulent behaviors have been widely explored in the
mobile app ecosystem [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29]. The
most common issue is ad fraud, where a miscreant’s code
fetches ads without displaying them to the user or “clicks”
ads automatically [30], [31], [32], [33], [34]. For example,
Crussell et al. [30] have revealed two fraudulent ad be-
haviors: (1) ads are requested by apps that are running
in the background and (2) ads are clicked without user
interaction (also known as click frauds [35]). More recently,
Dong et al. [28] reveal seven types of ad frauds and further
demonstrate that such ad fraudulent apps are also likely to
violate the policy of app markets, resulting in risks to be
removed from app markets [29]. Besides ad fraud, there are
also other types of frauds disclosed by several researchers.
For example, Liu et al. [26] have explored usage fraud, which
is invented to boost usage statistics on third-party analytics
like Google Analytics, resulting in inaccurate numbers that
could eventually fool investors to make wrong decisions.
Xie et al. [36] have analyzed the review fraud in mobile
apps and found that some mobile app developers turn to the
underground market to buy positive reviews. We also found
in this paper that FD apps use fake positive reviews for
app promotion. Our work is focusing on fraudulent dating
Android apps and has revealed a new type of fraudulent
behaviors, which have not been systemically studied.
7.2 Security and Privacy in Dating Apps/Online Dating
Website
Dating apps have raised security and privacy-related con-
cerns in recent years [37], [38], [39], [40], [41]. As shown
by Shetty et al. [37], mobile dating apps are potentially
vulnerable to security risks. For example, they have demon-
strated that it is quite trivial to conduct a man-in-the-middle
attack against most dating apps, resulting in private data
leaks of app users. Similarly, Hoang et al. [42] argue that
trilateration threatens location privacy of users of location-
based mobile apps. They demonstrate that it is possible
for an adversary to identify the location of an individual
when she/he is using dating apps, even under the situ-
ation where location-hiding features are enabled. Similar
findings have also been reported by Carman et al. [43],
who have empirically presented their experiments on a
popular dating app called Tinder. In addition to leaking
location information directly, certain sensitive information
(e.g., nearly usernames, profile pictures, messages, etc.) can
also be recovered from user’s devices based on the residual
data generated by dating apps [38]. Our work is not towards
the potential security and privacy concerns of legitimate
dating apps, but revealing a new type of malicious dating
apps, i.e., fraudulent dating apps.
Moreover, we want to clarify that, the fraudulent be-
haviors of these apps are different from the well-known
romance scam [9], [44], [45], [46]. In particular, the fraudulent
acts in romance scam are usually with the involvement of
real persons, who are communicating with victims through
phones, emails and try to access to victims’ money or
bank account. However, in FD apps, the chatbots instead
of real persons, are communicating with victims. The main
purpose is to lure the victim into buying premium service,
not the financial information. Though, we find there are
still some common aspects between them. For instance,
seductive account profile avatars are used to attract victims
in both romance scam and FD apps.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we perform a systematic study of fraudulent
dating apps, including its characteristics, business model,
distribution networks and their impact on affected users.
Our research has observed various findings that are pre-
viously unknown to the community. Due to the financial
loss to victims and the fact that current anti-virus engines
cannot detect most of these apps, we argue that an effective
solution should be proposed to detect such apps or block
the distribution of these apps in the first place to protect
users.
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